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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
The ambit of the regulation making power under the Economic 
Stabilisation Act 1948 has been of great significance in the 
general government control of the economy. Most commentators 
have recognised the width of the powers but at the same time 
have appreciated that there are limitations. 
1. Mr Muldoon 
was reported to have said of the power "You can do anything 
provided you can hang your hat on economic stabilisation" (The 
Times 14th April 1976 p.18). The Act provides the Government, 
through the Executive, with the power to introduce and 
implement broad policy measures which promote the economic 
stability of New Zealand. Regulations have been made 
pursuant to S.11 of the Act to freeze wages and prices, to 
freeze rents and other incomes and to introduce a carless days 
scheme. 
The great widt h a nd s cop e o f the sub jective e 1Bp owerin g l an g uage 
means that when attacking the validity of regulations made under 
it, the attack would be better based on a specific limitation of 
regulation-making itself rather t han a r g uing t hat the regulations 
were not permitted by the Act . I ndeed the his t o ry of the power 
shows that no regulation has been held to be unauthorised by the 
Act unless it ha s confl ic t e d wi th a const itu t i ona l princip le 
which fetter s th e power of regu l ation make r s . 
This not e will f o cu s ma i n ly on t h e t h ree mo s t i e c e nt case s 
that h ave a ri se n in r elation to this Act. I n Br a d e r v 
2. h Ministry of Transport t he Court o f Appeal he]d t at t he 
Economic St a bili sa tion (Co ns ervation of Pet ro l eum) 
( 
3 · h . 1 No.3) 1979 wer e aut orised b y t h e 948 Act. 
Reg ul at ions 
The regulations 
set up a scheme whereby each car owner was required to nominate 
a c arless da y - one on wh ich the c ar wou ld n o L b e d r i ven ( a n 
exemption was allowe d for es s e n t ial users ) . A ca r salesm a n 
was b ei n g pro s e c uted by th e Min istry for driv in g a car on i ts 
carless d a y. The cas e went to the Cou rt of Ap peal on a p oi nt 
of law and it was held unanimousl y that the regulations were 
valid. (AW [lERMW 
\ftUORIA uwvrnsm OF NWY'j10l\ 
4 
There was a challenge made to the va li dity o f the latest set 
of Wage Freeze Regulations 
4 · made under the 1948 Act in 
The New Zealand Drivers As soc iation v New Zealand Road Carriers 
5
· 
In that case the Drivers Association had claimed, prior to the 
regulations corning into force, an increase in wages. 
the matter could be heard by a Conciliation Council the 
Before 
1 
. . f . 6. 
regu at1ons came into orce. The matter w~s then set down 
to go to the Arbitration Court but before it got there an 
Amendment to the regulations came into force which prevented 
the Arbitration Court from hearing disputes of interest. 
When the challenge was made on the validity of ~he regulations 
the Arbitration Court referred the matter to the Cou!t of Appeal. 
In a split decision 
7
· the majority held that the Amendment to 
the regulations, the only part really at issue, was valid. 
The latest case to come before the Court of Appeal was 
Combined State Unions v State Services Co-ordinating Committee.
8
· 
The C.S.U. had sought an increase in expense allowances and 
also of the trades classification of one group of their members 
(with the purpose of achieving a higher rate of wa ges). They 
were supposed to take up the matter under the State Services 
Conditions of Employment Act 1977 with the respondents. The 
respondents refused to proceed with the matter because they 
considered it impossible during the period of the wage freeze. 
The majority held that the Committee had decided that it would 
not exercise its normal statutory function because it was 
prevented by the regulations from so doing. The C.S.U. 
challenged the validity of the regul ati ons in so far as they 
interfered with t he ope ration of the 1977 Act. The majority 
upheld the challenge and the regulat ions wer e held invalid in 
so far as they purported to inte rfere with the operation of 
the 1977 Act. 
The r e gulation making power prior to the Am e ndment Act of 1982 
is best looked at as a combination of SS. 3, 4 and 11. 
Sect ion 3 states that the general puLpose of the Act is to 
promote the economic stability of New Zealand. 
Section 4 (1) provides:-
"Functions of Minister - (1) The Minister shall be charged 
with the general function of doing all things he deems 
nec es sary or expedient for the general purpose of this Act, 
and in particular for the stabilisation, control and 
.5 
adjustment of prices of goods and services, rents, other 
costs, and rates of wages, salar i es and other income s." 
9
· 
Section 11 provides:-
"Stabilisation Regulations - (1) The Governor-General may 
from time to time by Order in Council, make such regulations 
(in this Act referred to as stabilisation regulations) as 
appear to him to be necessary or expedient for the general 
purpose of this Act and for giving full effect to the 
provisions of this Act and for the due administration of 
this Act." 
Section 11 continues, without limiting the general power, to 
provide some particular purposes for which regulations may be 
made. 
Since the decisions in the three cases that will be discussed 
in some depth in this note, Parliament has passed the Economic 
Stabilisation Amendment Act 1982. This has made some changes 
which will be discussed in more detail later in this note. It 
10. 
extended is sufficient to say now that the powers have been 
and a provision for disallowance has been enacted. 
11. 
A very close a nd det a i l e d examination of t h es e po we r s and t he 
regulations made under them up until 1978 wa s undertaken b y 
Deborah Shelton in her thesis "Government, The Economy and 
The Constitution". In discussing the powers conferred by 
SS. 3, 4 and 11, she concluded;-
"Although the precise limits of the power conferred in the 
Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 are not clearly defined, 
the Act, when compared with the Emergency Regulations 
Act 1939 or the Supply Regul a tio n s Ac t 1 9 47, appear s to 
confer not a wfde emer g en cy typ e powe r but a na rrowe r 
more r e strain e d power , for i nst anc e ther e is n o power 
conferred to ame nd , s u s p end o r repeal s tatu Les by 
regul a t i on s mad e un de r th e Act . 
The Act does specifically grant c ertain unu s ual and 
p oten t ia l ly wid e power s i11 the section a uthorisi n g ~h e 
making of regulation s - a po we r to s u b- d e l ega t e t h e 
delegate d legislati v e po wer , a p o wer t o appoint off i c i als 
and committees and a certai n p ower t o l e gis late on matters 
of principle. 12. 
The r e c ent cas e s th at will b e discussed sho w th at a lthou gh there 
wa s n o express power t o inte rf ere wit h s ta~ utes t h e r e was a uthority 
to do so. The power to make r e gulat i ons has b ee n interp r eted 
widely and literally. 
6 
Part II of this note will discuss one approach used for testing 
the validity of the regulations. It will focus on the 
'reasonably capable' test for validity as discussed and 
applied in Brader's Case 
13 · and the Drivers' Case. 
14
· 
Part III will examine a second approach used to test the 
validity of regulations. It discusses the effect of the 
constitutional considerations the Court takes into account: 
(1) the interpretive presumption that the executive may not 
make regulations which interfere with or are repugnant to 
statutes, (2) the presumption that regulations may not 
detract from the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts. 
Part IV will attempt to evaluate the present position of 
judicial review of delegated legislation as demonstrated by 
these cases. It will make some brief comments on the state 
of the Constitution and separation of powers theory in the 
light of these decisions and the recent amendment to the 
Economic Stabilisation Act. 
7 
PART II 
THE 'REASONABLY CAPABLE' TEST 
1. THE TEST 
Although the regulation making power in S.11 is worded 
subjectively - "as appear to him ... " 
15
· the Courts have 
held that this does not confer an unbridled power. 
Richmond Jin Shop Employees v Attorney General 
16
· quoted 
from Attorney General for Canada v Hallet & Carey Ltd 
17
· 
where Lord Radcliffe said of a similar subjective empowering 
provision: 
"Parliament has chosen to say explicitly that he (the 
Governor-General) shall do whatever things he deems 
necessary or advisable. That does not allow him to do 
whatever he may feel inclined, for what he does must be 
capable of being related to one of the prescribed purposes, 
and the Court is entitled to read the Act in this way." 
This extract illustrates that where the opinion of the 
Governor-General is the criterion, it does not mean that 
whatever he regulates will be valid. Howeve r, this passage 
does not mean that the Court may merely substitute its 
opinion for that of the Governor-General. Rather it 
illustrates that the opinion the Governor-General must have 
held must be capable of being related to the purposes of the 
power. Thus the Court's power of review lies somewhere in 
between the two "opinions". This point was made in a slightly 
different way by •rurner P in the ~~~ Employees Case: 
"It (S .11) provides that the Go verno r·-General may make such 
regulations _as appear to ~.im so to be necessary. Mr Arndi.. 
(Counsel for the plaintiff a rguing that the regulations 
were invalid) must accordingly take us to the point where 
we a r e able to say that the r e gu la t ion s could not re a sonal> .I y 
be considered necessary o r expedie nt fo r th e economic 
stability of New Zealand ." 18. 
This same approach was adopted in Brader's case. Cooke J said: 
"By S.11 the opinion of the Go vernor -Ge neral in Council is 
the criterion but that do es not mean that the power of th e 
executive is practically u nlimited. The Court has to ask, 
if the proceedings before it so require, whether the 
regulations are capable of being regarded as necessary or 
expedient for the general purposes of the Act. A tenuou s 
or remote connection with economic stability would not be 
enough, it would invite an inference that the regulations 
had not really been intended for the purposes authorised 
8 
by Parliament. The more indirect the connection the more 
the Court w o u 1 d have to be re a d y i : o draw t ha t i n f e re n c e . " l 9 . 
The same test was adopted in the Drivers' case. 
stated it as follows:-
The majority 
"The Court is concerned with whether, on the true inter-
pretation of the parent Act, regulations are within the 
powers conferred by Parliament. They will be invalid if 
they are shown to be not reasonably capable of being 
regarded as serving the purpose for which the Act 
authorises regulations. If the only suggested connection 
with that purpose is remote or tenuous, the Court may 
infer that they cannot truly have been made for that 
purpose. 20 · 
Before the discussion of this test is continued it is worth 
noting some of the other points made in the judgments in 
these cases which relate to the test. 
Firstly, that the regulation making power is very wide. This 
is the result of enacting a general power which is restricted 
only by its reference to the stated purpose of the Act. As 
Turner P put it in Shop Employee s 
" a statute which does no more than the Economic 
Stabilisation Act,if it includes a general power to make 
regulations to implement its expressed policys, calls for 
a liberal meaning to be accorded to such a section; for 
the legislature in enacting it must be taken to have 
intended to create a wide and general power against 
contingencies the exact nature of which it was unable 
at the moment of passing the Act to foresee~ 21. 
He continued further on: 
"The ambit of the Act itself must by reason of the nature of 
its subject-matter be regarded as a wide one. Measures Lo 
secure the economic stability of New Zealand need not 
usually be considered unless that economic stability 
appears in come degree to be threatened ... " 22. 
Exactly what is meant by the economic stability of New Zealand 
remains vague and unclear. Cooke Jin Brader approved some 
comments of Smith Jin Otago Harbour Board v Mackintosh Cayley 
Phoenix Ltd: 
"Economic stability implies the stability of the economic 
system as it has already beeu established. It implies its 
firmness, steadiness, its ability to stand without being 
overthrown. This stability is not inconsistent with some 
change or movement, but it implies a freedom from 
essential change and a tendency to recover a state of 
balance." 23. 
9 
A number of points can be ma de a bout these passages. 
Firstly, the Court is unable to test the validity of the 
regulations by reference to a series of specific guidelines . 
This is due to the nature of the empowering position, i.e. 
a general power for a general purpose. 
Secondly, the general purpose is itself very wide. There are 
many factors which may be perceived as an apparent threat to 
economic stability, Thus there is a need to accord a literal 
meaning to it so as not to exclude rnatters ' that Parliament 
may have intended to be encompassed within it. 
Thirdly, the test that has been developed is essentially one 
that endeavours to take an objective look at a subjective 
requirement. By this is meant that the Court will determine 
whether, objectively, the opinion that the Governor-General 
must have held was one that was capable of being held. They 
will determine whether the regulations were reasonably capable 
of being regarded as necessary or expedient for promoting the 
economic stability of New Zealand. 
A useful illustration of how the test worked in practice can be 
seen in the Drivers' case. The decision is also interesting 
in that it was by a very narrow majority that the regulation 
SA was held to satisfy the test . The minority judgment is 
the only occasion on which regulations have been held to fail 
the test. Furthermore, there are some interesting points that 
can be made from it. 
Th e facts of the case have bee n mentioned. What was at issue 
was . 24. . h whether regulation SA was ultra vires t e Act. 
Regul ation SA prevents the operation of a series of statutory 
bodies, including Tribunals and Courts, from exercising all 
or som e of their jurisdiction especially in the wage fixing 
area. Regulation SA(l) (b) is the one relevant to this case. 
It provides:-
"N o dispute of interest shall be determined b y the 
Arbitration Court and no proceedings in relation to any such 
dispute which have been commen ced but not completed before 
the commencement of thi s regulation shall be continued." 
10 
ban on 
Counsel for the Drivers argued tha.t th:is/proceeding with and 
determination of disputes of int e rest was invalid a s it was 
absolute and unqualified prohibition. That the eradication 
of the largest part of the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court 
cannot be related as being reasonably necessary or expedient for 
the purposes of the policy of economic stabilisation enacted in 
the 1948 Act. Furthermore the Act should not be construed as 
authorising the removal of the rights of the subject to take a 
case to the established Courts (such as the Arbitration Court). 
The majority,in holding that the 'reasonably capable' test was 
satisfied, made the point that althouth regulation 5 prevented 
increases in remuneration there were some other non-remunerative 
increases that could be made. These could have included matters 
concerned with worker safety or other working conditions. This 
could have resulted in increased costs to the employer. It was 
unfair that the employer would be unable to pass this on. They 
thought that virtually every claim made in a dispute of interest 
would have some bearing on the economic stability in that it 
would effect costs in some way. If these built up i t could 
effect costs significantly. 
their conclusion that: 
Of some importance to them was 
"Even cent rises in prices to the public can matter. All 
inroads into a freeze could be dangerous in principle. 
The policy of as near as possible a total freeze is aimed 
at holding the overall position. In our opinion the 
Courts cannot say that this policy is not reasonably 
capable of being adopted for the purpose of economic 
stability." 25. 
Furthermore they thought that th e fa ct that regulation 5 did not 
ban the hearing of d i sputes o f interest, raLher onl y the settling 
of them, meant that a base could be built from which a claim 
could be launched immediately ~fter the end of the freeze. 
Thus the fixing of rates could be accelerat e d. They argued 
that any stability hard won by the fr e eze could be shattered. 
Th e se cons idera ti ons le d to the i r c onclusion that r e g ulation SA 
was rea s onably capabl e of bein g r e garded as "necess a ry or 
expedient to eliminate the risks and close the qaps left by 
. S 11 26. regulation . 
11 
The majority then went on to c ons i der wh eth e r the r e gulations 
were invalid because they detracted from the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary Courts. 
later. 
This p a rt o f t h e cas e will be discu s sed 
It is interesting to note and compare the approach of the 
minority judgment. Although they used the same test and the 
same considerations they held that the regulation failed to 
satisfy the reasonably capable test. 
The minority did not accept the argument about the non-
remunerative awards upsetting economic stability, nor did they 
accept the argument about the build-up of pressure during the 
freeze period which may be released in an explosive fashion 
just after the end of it. What was conclusive for them was that 
regulations 5 and 8 were together sufficient and totally 
effective in achieving a wage freeze during the period. 
Therefore they concluded that reg u lation SA a dded nothing at 
all to the regulations as a whole and thus could not reasonably 
be thought to promote one of t he purp o se s of t he Act. 
r e asoning i s based on th e v iew that the pur p os e of t he 
Thi s 
regulations was to impose a wage freeze. 
as much: 
The minority say 
"As their name suggests, th e ir purpose an d indeed their 
undoubted effect it to prevent (with certain very limited 
exceptions) any increase in wages or salaries until after 
22 June 1983." 27. 
The reason th e majority and t he mi nority d iffered can b e 
explained, in pa r t , b y the differ e nt a p pro ac h es the y t oo k. Th e 
application of th e re asonabl y capabl e t est i nvol v e s an e x a m-
ination of "the central and dominant purpo s e of the 
regulation s ''. 28 · As i s di scussed l a ter in thi s part the 
objects of an Act or regulations ma y be ga thered only from the 
language (used) in them. It is submitted that there is a 
d is tin c ti o n between 'pu rp ose ', 'e f fect ' a n d 'means ' . It 
is also submitted that confu s ion o f these th ree may, and in 
this case did, lead to differ e nt r esults. 
The minority decision was bas e d on a conclu s ion that the 
purpose of the regulations was to i mpose a wage freeze for the 
freeze period. This conclu s ion may have been reached because 
12 
of the specific mention of wage control in S.4(2). Th e 
majority, however, thought d i ffe re n t ly. They argued that 
r egulat i on 5(2) whi ch b a nned the maki n g o f in s trument s which 
would come into effect just after th e freeze period ended 
indicated that the makers of the regulations were concerned with 
what happened beyond the freeze. Th e y also thought it an 
important consideration that the Wag e Freeze Regulations were 
part of a package including the Pfice Freeze, the Rent Freeze, 
the Companies (Limitation of Distribution), the Professional 
Charges (Price Freeze), Financial Services and the Limitation 
of Directors' Fees Regulations. From this they concluded 
that the purpose of the regulations was to promote economic 
stability rather than merely to impose a wage freeze, this 
they considered to be the means chosen to promote the purpose. 
Support for this view can indirectly be found in the 
Explanatory Note at the end of th e regulations.
29
· It is 
stated that the note is not part of the regulations but is 
intended to indicate their general eff e ct. It provides: 
"These regulations which come into force on 23~d day 
of June 1982, fr e eze rat e s o f r e muneration until the 
close of the 22 nd d a y of June 1983. " 
It is possible to argue from this that the effect of the 
regulations is to impose a wage free z e whereas the purpose of 
them is to promote the economic stability. 
It is submitted that this distinc t ion between the majority and 
minority is crucial to their decisions. The majority thought 
that the purpose of the regulaiions was to promote economic 
stability and that the me an s or ef fect was a wage freeze. 
Th e mino r i ty, h o wever, appeared to think that the purpose of 
the regulation s wa s to imp ose a wage fre ez e for the year. Thu s 
wh e n it came t o t es ti ng t h e val i dity of r e gulation SA the 
majority asked wh e t he r it c ou l d b e xe a s onably capable of being 
regarded as ne c essary or exp e di e nt for the promotion of 
economic stability, whil e the minority questioned whether the 
pu r pose of regulation SA achieve d any t h ing at all, given that 
a complete wage freeze was alr e ad y i mposed by regulation 5 
combin e d with the support given b y regulation 8. 
If the limited purpo s e approach of the minority is adopted 
their argument becomes virtually unanswerable. The definition 
13 
f t . . th . 3 0. 1 o remunera ion in e regulations re ates to that in 
the Wage Adjustment Regulations 1974.
31 · 
""Remuneration" means salary or wages and all other 
payments of any kind whatsoev,~r payable to a worker." 
No increases in remuneration are allowed. 
32. 
that in terms of a wage freeze regulation 5 
It is submitted 
is fully effective 
in securing a wage freeze within the freeze period. Two 
consequences flow from this. Firstly the argument that the 
freeze period could be used to do all the groundwork in wage 
negoti~tions and then just after the end of the freeze there 
will be a rush of award increases becomes irrelevant because 
these will take place after the freeze period. Secondly, the 
argument that non-remunerative conditions of employment 
disputes of interest will be outside the ambit of the freeze also 
becomes irrelevant because the freeze is only intended to freeze 
wages. Every kind of possible allowance that would take the 
form of a payment cannot be increase d - thus a total 
remuneration freeze is effected . This is the probable 
explanation why the minority did not attach so much weight o r 
significance to these arguments as did the majority. Whi le 
they may affect economic stability their effect on a wage freeze 
is, at the greatest, minimal. 
It is submitted that the more ge neral purpose adopted by the 
majority is correct. The purpo se of the Governor-General in 
Council in making regulations is to promote the economic 
stability of New Zealand. It is further submitted that a close 
inspection of the empowering provisions supports this v i ew. 
Regulations may be made on ly i f in terms of S.3 they ar e 
rea sonably capable of being regarded as nece ssary or expendie nt 
for promoting the economic stability of New Zealand. In S.4(2 ) 
the Minister i s charged with d oing all that he deems necessary 
or expedient for the general purpose of the Act and jncludes 
If this a reference to the stabilisation or control of wages. 
app roach is adopted th e ques tion then becomes whether 
regulation SA is re asonably capahle of being regarded as 
necessar y or expedient to promote the economic stability. 
The point must be made that regulation SA was an amendment 
14 
to the original regulations. 
isolation. Thus it is to be 
It was challenged in 
judged in the light of the 
wage freeze already imposed by regulation 5. Regulation SA 
could not be defended by arguing that it prevents various 
bodies giving wage increases because that is a job already 
done by regulations 5 and 8. It has to have some effect 
beyond this which can reasonably be regarded as capable of 
promoting economic stability. 
2. EVIDENCE 
It is at this stage that a very important matter arises. 
In deciding the outcome of the test, what considerations 
should the Court take into account? Further-
more what sort of evidence is admissable in argument either 
for or against the validity of the regulations? The issue 
is further complicated by the fact that many of the 
considerations must, by nature of the topic, be conjectural. 
The starting point for the Courts will always be the words 
of the empowering statute and the regulations. This 
approach has been shown in the cases already discussed. The 
Courts will, by reference to the express terms of the statute, 
decide what the purpose of the Act is . If the regulations are 
permitted to be made to promote the general purpose of the 
Act, then the Courts will decide what the object of the 
regulations .is. 
The matter was discussed in Brade r's case. The judgment of 
McMullin J is particularly u seful . 
in Carroll v Attorney General for 
He referred to a passage 
" 33. h. h . New Zealana w ic is ----
worth quoting here: 
"'I'he Courts have no concern with the reasonableness of 
the regulation; they hav e no concern with its policy 
or that of the Government re sp onsible for its promulgation. 
They merely construe the Act under whi ch the regulation 
purports to be made giving t he statute .... such fair 
large and liberal interpretation as will best attain its 
objects. Then they look at the regulation complained of. 
If it is within the object s and intention of the Act, it 
is valid ..... The objects and intention of this Act can, 
of course, be gathered only from the words used, and, in 
my opinion the same rule applies to the construction of 
the regulations." 
15 
This is very much a question of l a w for the Courts alone to 
decide. Extrinsic evidence wil l not be allowed if it is 
intended to show th e purpose o f t he r egulations. In Brader's 
and in Carroll's case affidavits were submitted by Government 
officlals. In the latter case the affidavit was excluded 
because the official expressed an opinion as to the purpose 
of the regulations. In Brader's the affidavit evidence was 
admissable because it showed only the workings and the effects 
of the regulations. As McMullin J said: 
"Whether regulations are or are not ultra vires a 
statute is a matter which is usually to be decided 
on the face of the regulations without recourse to 
extrinsic evidence. But there may be cases in which 
regulations are so technical in content as to require 
some elucidation as to their practical working." 34. 
Again then, there is this distinction between purpose and 
effect. In the Drivers' case, therefore, if the validity of 
the original regulations had been at issue, the minority would 
not have admitted evi d en ce which wo u ld s ho w t he effect o f the 
regulations because the effect of the regulations. was what they 
considered to be th e pu rpo s e . The ma jority would h ave admi t ted 
evidence to show the effe ct o f the regulat i o ns, i.e. to s h ow 
that the wage freeze would bring inflation down. 
obviously could lead to some confusion. 
This 
The point was made in an art ic le by J L Cal d well th at a dmiss i on 
of evidence to show the effects of regulations is to let 
evidence which shows the "ob j ect s and purpo s e of th e r egulat io n s 
35 
through the ba c k door . " · 
He f u r ther poi n t s o u t th at it is n at u ral t o a ss um e t hat wh at th e 
regulation achieved wa s wha t it was in ten de d to a chi eve. Thu s 
i t is no real step f rom s how i ng t h e ef f ec t s o f the regu la tions 
to showing the purpose o f t h em. 
If the effect of the regulations can be clearly es tablished t h e 
Co urt will be mo re l ike l y to draw th e in fe rence as Lo t h e 
purpo se of th e regulat i on s wh i ch flow f rom th e effe c t. In 
terms of Brader's c a se, on ce it wa s f irmly est ab l i shed Lh at 
th e e ff e ct of the regulati ons woul d be to c on serve p etroleum 
and that a failure to conserve could adversely affect the 
economy (all matters within the grasp of the average citizen) 
then the logical inference to draw from this is that the 
16 
regulations could reasonably be regarded as necessary for the 
purpose of economic stability. 
If the effect of the regulations is a question of fact, then 
as Turner J said in Reade v Smith 36 • the question will be 
very difficult to resolve against the Crown. Furthermore if 
the effect is a matter of opinion or speculation as to 
future possibilities it must be almost impossible to resolve 
against the Crown. This process of admitting extrinsic 
evidence is thus heavily weighted in favour of the Crown. 
They will have the best, most acceptable, sources of information. 
If the Government can show that the regulations have some effects 
reasonably capable of being related to economic stability they 
will be virtually home and dry. 
Furthermore if the party arguing that the regulations were 
invalid had conclusive evidence that the regulations were made 
for the purpose of, for example, curbing the Trade Unions, then 
it would be inadmissable even though it shows clearly that the 
regulations, while they may incidentally have an effect on 
economic stabilisation, have a central and dominant object 
designed to promote something entirely different. It is 
submitted that there is likely to be a presumption in favour 
of the evidence of the Crown. If they can show that the 
regulations would have, or had, some beneficial effect on the 
economic stability of New Zealand, or would have some effect 
that was capable of being regarded as necessary or expedient 
for the p romotion of economic stability, then the regulations 
will prevail. 
Evidence is of course only really relevant to questions of 
fact and in many cases the regulations can be judged on 
questions of law only. In _Reade v Smith_ for example the matter 
was decided on a question of law because the effect of the 
regulations was against one of the express purposes or policys 
of the Act, thus invalid. The question in Brader's case was 
much more a question of fact. The question of the validity of 
regulation SA in the Drivers'case is rnuch harder to categorise. 
Regulation SA was not expressly authorised by the statute but at 
the same time was not contrary to its express policies. The 
majority looked at the effects regulation SA might have and 
decided that these would hav8 some effect on economic 
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stability. The interesting point to note is that the Court 
did this without, it appears, any actual hard fact evidence of 
the effects of the regulation. If the facts of the case were 
changed slightly and the amendment had been made six months 
after the original regulations and challenged six months later, 
the result may have been different. The Drivers' may have 
been able to bring evidence to show that over that period 
regulation SA had had no effect at all on the situation brought 
about by the original regulations. 
Any challenge based on evidence must involve evidence to show 
that the state 6f knowledge at the time the regulations were 
made was such that it was known by the regulation makers, or 
obvious to them, that these regulations would have no effect 
at all reasonably capable of being regarded as necessary or 
expedient for promoting economic stability. However, it is ·I. 
clear that it would be very difficult to establish this. 
The way the Drivers' case was settled was very much on the 
basis of opinion. In the opini o n of th e majority it was 
possible that regulation SA may h ave ha d s ome effect on 
economic stability, the minority thought not. The decision 
could thus be classified as part-law and part-opinion based 
on general knowledge rather than admitted expert evidence. 
It is submitted that it is this sort of complex question which 
the Court will have enormous difficulty in deciding. The 
weight to be given to each consideratio n will be very hard to 
determine. Exactly what sort o f consi de rations are admissab le 
remains u nc lea r . 
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PART III 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND INTERPRETIVE PRESUMPTIONS 
Even though regulations may satisfy the reasonably capable test 
they may still be held invalid if they offend a constitutional 
principle. There are certain constitutional principles which 
limit the scope and powers of the executive to legislate. 
From these principles the Courts have developed a set of 
presumptions of interpretation. Based upon the principle that 
the Crown may not suspend the laws of Parliament 37 · there is 
the presumption that regulations will not derogate from statutes. 
They will look to see if the provisions of the regulations clash 
or are inconsistent with the provisions of any statutes. If 
they do the regulations will be presumed to be invalid unless 
there is clear antecedent authority from Parliament for the 
inconsistency. An example of anteceden t authority is the 
new S.llA 
38
· of the Economic Stabilisation Act which · will be 
dis c ussed in mo re detai l i n Part I V. 
Also based on constitutional principle is what is known as the 
rule in Chester v Bateson 
39
· The Courts have formed the 
presumption that regulations should not deprive the citizen of 
his right to go before the Courts to seek determination of his 
rights 40 · unless there is very clear parliamentary authorisation. 
The majority in the Drivers' case expressed doubt about the 
ability of Parliament itself to r e mov e the jurjsdiction of the 
Courts. This pr inc i ple and pres ump tio n will b e discussed 
later in the n o te. 
h . . . h S 4 1. T e maJority in t e C .. u. case ba sed their d e cision on the 
presumption that regulations may not derogate from statutes 
unless authorised. They said: 
"It is a.n important constitutional principle that 
subordinate legisl a tion cann o t re peal or in t erfere with 
the operation of a statute except with the antecedent 
authority of Parli a ment itsel f . It is a co nstitutional 
principle because it gives effect to the primacy of 
Parliament in the whole field of legislation. And as a 
corollary a rule of construction springs from it that the 
Courts will not accept that Parliament has intended its 
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own enactments to be subject to suspension amendment or 
repeal by any kind of subordinate regulation at the hand 
of the Executive unless direct and unambiguous authority 
has been spelled out to that effec~, or is to be found 
as a matter of necessary intendment, in the parent 
statute." 42. 
It is submitted that the Court appears to have confused the 
principle and the presumption. They have confused it because 
they have not really drawn a distinction between them. What 
they describe as the constitutional principle in the first 
sentence of the quote just given is in fact the interpretive 
presumption. The second sentence is the constitutional principle. 
The principle is that Parliament is supreme. The rule of 
construction is just an expansion of the presumption. The 
distinction becomes important and will be discussed later in 
relation to the difference in judicial approach in the C.S.U . 
., 43. case and the case of Auckland City Corporation v Taylor. 
The Shop Employees case 44 · dealt in part with the question of 
repugnancy. It was argued by the Shop Employees that the 
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purported by 
regulation 16(5) and (6) to limit the powers o f th e Cour t of 
Arbitration which was set up by the provisions of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954. One of the questions 
asked of the Court of Appeal was whether regulation 16(5) and (6) 
was ultra vires and void by reason of repugnancy to the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954 and in particular 
to SS 32, 36 and 47(1) thereof. 
Deborah S~elton in her thesis made an excellent summary of the 
Court ' s decisio n: 
"The Court found that although t h e Court of Arbitation had, 
under the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1954, 
a wide jurisdiction in industrial matters , t h is jurisdiction 
was limited by the qualification in S.36, that orders of the 
Court could not be 'inconsistent with this or any other Act' 
Section 4 of the Acts Interpretation Act 19 24 provides that 
the word 'Act' when used in any statute includes not only 
an Act of Parliament but also rules and regulations made 
thereunder. The Court of Appeal held that the regulation 
was not repugnant to the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act 1954 . The jurisdicti on of the Cour~ of 
Arbitration had never been absolute, S.36 restricted the 
Court to making orders not inconsistent with any other 
statutes or regulations." 
20 
This extract illustrates that although th e regul a tions did 
interfere with the operation of the statute it was not invalid 
because of the limitation placed on t h e ope ration of the statute 
by the statute itself. In other words Parliament was held to 
have intended that the Court's jurisdiction not be complete. 
This intention was sufficient antecedent authority for the 
interference. The Court did not really have to discuss whether 
the Economic Stabilisation Act authorised inconsistency with 
statutes. However, there are implications throughout the judgments 
that the ambit of the Act is such that to fulfill its purposes 
it is inevitable that regulations made under it will trespass 
on other statutes, especially in the heavily-statute controlled 
area of wage fixing. 
Richmond J said: 
"I have reached the conclusion that it must have been the 
intention of the legislature when it enacted the Economic 
Stabilisation Act, to authorise the making of regulations 
which would, to such extent a s th e Governor - General in 
Council might consider necessary or expedient for the 
general purposes of the Act, der o gat e in some de9ree 
from the ord i nary s ta t ut o ry proced u res f or f ixing ra tes 
of wage s i n various sectors o f the c ommunity." 46. 
This effectively amounts to a statement that Parliament must be 
taken to have implicitly authorised a certain amount of 
interference. However, as Turner P s aid : 
"Whether such regulations go s o f ar a s to transgress the 
proper ambit of the empowering section in any given case 
may possibly become ultimately a question of degree." 47. 
This retains an element of flexibility for the Courts and 
furthermore it is probabl e th a t n o othe r a p proach would really 
work . It is interesting t o not e th at the reasonably capable 
test is also based to some extent upon degree. In terms of 
the Brad e r discussion of the ques ti on by Cooke J, just when a 
con n ection is remote or tenuous is d ef initely a question of 
d 
4 8. 
egree. 
Exactl y th e s ame issue arose on th e f a c ts of th e Drivers' case 
but was not really address e d. The r eg u lat ion cl e arly d e rogated 
and in te rfered with t he wo rk ings of the Industri a l Rela ti ons 
Act 1973 and many other Acts besid e s . This could hav e been due 
to the decision in the Shop Employee s 1 cas e . The Industrial 
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Relations Act s~48(4) is the equivalent of S.36 of the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. The Court thought that 
regulation 5 was a valid limitation on the Arbitration Court and 
thus inferentially upon the statute that set it up. 
The C.S.U. case is a good illustration of Turner P's comment 
that it is a question of degree. In that case the challenge 
to the regulations was based on an alleged inconsistency with 
the provisions of the State Services Conditions of Employment 
Act 1977. The challenge was in effect that the regulations 
should not apply where the provisions of the 1977 Act already 
applied. The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed. 
As with much of New Zealand's wage and salary negotiations 
the procedures and guidelines for controlling conditions of 
e mployment in the State Services is provided by statute. The 
1977 Act was an attempt to encapsulate in a statute a structured 
and co-ordinated means of administering employment conditions 
of the State Services. The Act sets up a numb er of Tribunals 
and other methods for hearing applicati ons and s ettling dj s putes . 
One s uch body was the S tat e Servi ces Co -ordinatin g Commilt.c~e . 
The code provided by the Act was intended to b e exclusive . 
S.6(1) provides: "Except as otherwise provide d in this Act and 
notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other enactment 
as from the commen c ement of this Ac t , the condit ion s of e mp loyme n t 
of employees in the State Services shall be pr e scribed by an 
employing authority by determination under this Act and not otherwise." 
(emphasis added by the majority.). 
Th e ma jo r ity t h ought that this was a n important provis i on l h at 
49. f con tai ned 'strong langua ge'. The y an al y sed t h e eff ect. o 
the regulations upon the provision s of the Act and concluded: 
"So quite clearly there is an i nconsistenc y between Ac t 
and Regulations in three important respec ts . First 
there is the direct conflict with S6(1). Second, the 
regulations attempt to impos e a n overridi ng qualifi cat ion 
upon the statutory criteria. And third they would 
abrogate the revi e w p r o v i s ions of th e Ac t." 5 0 . 
Be a rin g in mind th e constitut io n a l prin c iple a nd th e pre s umptio n 
based on it the majority discu s sed wheth e r th e Economic S t abilisation 
Act gave the necessary antec e dent authority fo r regulation s to ove r-
rid e sta tut e s. It po inted out that virtually a ll wage ag r eeme n ts 
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in New Zealand were subject to some statutory control. It 
drew the distinction between the Arbitration Court legislation 
(The Industrial Relations Act 1975) and the State Services 
Conditions of Employment Act 1977 in that there is no equivalent 
to S.48(1) which prohibits the Arbitration Court making orders 
inconsistent with any other Act in the 1977 Act. The Court 
referred to Turner Pin the Shop Employees' case and concluded: 
spirit and "We think that in the light of its/declared purposesthe 
Act is wide enough to authorise regulations controlling 
wages payable directly or indirectly under statutory schemes. 
To treat a statute controlled area as automatically outside 
the reach of the Act would be to emasculate or frustrate
51 seriously the power that Parliament conferred in 1948." • 
The Court clearly anticipated that there may be occasions where 
the regulations would be valid even though inconsistent with other 
statutes. However they continued: 
"Therefore the issue must involve a weighing of alternatives. 
Weighing them we think that our constitutional duty is to 
resolve any conflict or doubt that arises in favour of the 
supremacy of Parliament. That is to say, special legislation 
as strongly worded as the 1977 Act is not to be overridden 
by mere regulations unless the authority to override it has 
been squarely and undoubtedly been given by Parliament. Any 
other resolution would be too dangerous a constitutional 
precedent. In a case as balanced as this one, it is vital 
that the Court should come down firmly on the side of that 
basic principle of democracy. We therefore hold unanimously 
that the Wage Freeze Regulations do not override the special 
code in the State Services Co nditions of Employment Act." 52. 
To summarise the majority approach without, it is hoped, doing too 
much violence to their reasoning. 
Constitutional principle demands that there js a general rule that 
delegated legislation which interfere s with, or is repugnant to, 
the operation of a statute except with the antecedent authority of 
Parliament will be presumed to be invalid. Due to the special 
nature of the Economic Stabilisation Act, Parliament must be taken 
to have intended that there would be occasions, especially in the 
wages field, when statutory procedures would be interfered with 
by regulations. When a statute is of such a nature as the State 
Services Conditions of Emplo yment Act, i.e. legislation specifically 
enacted to provide for a particular purpose after due consideration 
and which clearly purports to have exclusive jurisdiction, the 
Court will take it that it was not intended to be orderidden by mere 
regulation unless there was clear antecedent authority. 
23 
The approach of the Courts in the Shop Employees'and the C.S.U. cases 
is interesting to compare to that taken by Perry Jin Auckland City 
. 5 3. Corporation v Taylor. That case was very similar to the C.S.U. 
decision. The case considered the effect of the Economic 
Stabilisation (Rent} Regulations 1976 
54 
had on the Rent Appeal Act. 
The regulations provided for an overriding and predominant 
consideration to be taken into account by every Rent Appeal Board, 
and were clearly in conflict with the provisions of S.8 of the 
Rent Appeal Act 1973. 
Perry J said: 
"To hold that the government may by regulation alt~r a statute 
enacted for a specific purpose or to hold that when the 
legislature has carefully set out the way in which the board 
is to assess an equitable rent then that can be completely 
overridden by a regulation specifically incorporating 'an 
overriding and predominant consideration' is, in my view, a 
very sweeping claim. Here we have an Act of Parliament 
specifically enacted for the purpose of determining the 
equitable rents of dwelling houses - providing for the 
establishment of Rent Appeal Boards to make such qeterminations 
and setting out in careful de ta i l the way i n wh i ch such board s 
are to exer c ise their j ur is di ct i o n. " 
He continued: 
"The question, then, is whether the Economic Stabilisation Act 
1948 authorises the modification of such an Act. In the 
absence of a specific power I do n ot consider it does." 
There are two important points to note from these passages. Firstly 
Perry J placed much emphasis on the fact that it wasJstatute enacted 
for a specific purpose very carefully enacted, seemingly complete 
and exhaustive. Secondly that he r equired express, specific 
authorisation to over r ide t h e sta t 1t e be fo r e Lhc re gul a tions coul d 
be valid ·.' 
As in the C.S.U. case there was no provision in the Rent Appeal 
Act similar to S.48(1) of the Industrial Relations Act which limjted 
the jurisdiction of the Ac t. Th e r eli ance o n the texture of the 
Act interfered with was the same in both cases. The absence of 
any mention of Taylo~ case i n th e C. S . U. 
explained by the fact that in the Dr i vers' 
decis i on may be 
case the Solicitor-
General had sought to have it overruled by the Court of Appeal, 
be c au s e o f i t s s i mi 1 a r i t y to the ~. S . l!_:_ c a s e the Co u r t ma y no t 
have wanted to mention it. This is purely conjecture. 
(}.11 UBR7>.iW 
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It is submitted that there is a diff e rence in approach between 
Perry Jin Tay~or and the Court of Ap p e a l in Shop Employees and 
the C.S.U. case. Perry J gave the i nt e rpretive presumption 
the standing of a rule that could not be defeated except by 
express antecedent authorisation. The majority in the C.S.U. 
considered that the presumption did not require specific express 
antecedent authority and was a major consideration in a 'weighing 
of alternatives.' 
It is submitted that the Courts in these cases have been faced 
not merely with a clash between regulations and an Act but also 
between Acts. This is an issue that has been lying beneath the 
decisions in the cases. The decisions have tackled the clash 
between regulation and Act, but only in part the clash between 
Acts. They have tackled the symption but have not really 
addressed the cause. The wage, price and rent freeze measures 
taken under the Act have all been accepted as valid uses of the 
regulation making power. Turner Pin Shop Employees commented 
that a ceiling on salaries and wages was just the sort of thing 
l ikel y t o be imp o s e d for t he purposes o f th e Ac t. 55 · It is a 
c lash of textures. There is the wi de g enera l p ower given by 
the Economic Stabilisation Act and the specific provisions of an 
Act like the State Services Conditions of Employment Act. In the 
C.S.U. case the great reliance pl a ce d o n S.6(1) illustrated that 
the Act intended to pr6vide an exclus i ve code. In the Shop 
Employees case S.36(1) of the Industr i al Conciliation and 
Arbiration Act indicated that the Court wa s not intended to be 
s acrosanct or exclusive. What the Co urt s did n ot address was when 
t he E conom i c Stabil isat ion Ac t wa s t o tak e ove r f r o m t h e ordina r y 
s tatu t e s, t hey sto pped s hor t, 
o f degre e. 
McMul l in Jin the mi no r i ty in 
sayi n g o nl y tha ~ i t wa s a matter 
the C. S . U . ca s e ha s s pecifically 
a ddressed this clash of texture s . He saw the is s u e in the case as: 
"Whether or not this challenge can be sustained depends on the construction to b e placed up on ce rtain p r ovisions of th e State Se rvi c e s Conditi o n s o f Emp loyme nt Act, S.6(1) in p a rt icular, a n d a cons i de r ation of t he r e lat io n s h ip betwee n that Ac t and the Economic Stabil isat ion Act." 56. (emphasis added) 
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He went on to discuss the two Acts and concluded: 
"This compendious phrase (the opening words of S.6(1)) 
does no more than emphasise that conditions of employment 
shall be determined under the State Services Conditions of 
Employment Act and no other Act. But it does not impinge 
upon the operation of the Economic Stabilisation Act. There 
is no reason why both enactments should not stand together. 
They are intended to apply to different circumstances and 
they are not mutually repugnant. The Executive is left 
free to invoke the Economic Stabilisation Act if it can 
reasonably form an opinion that a movement in wages likely 
to occur on the application of the formula provisions of 
the State Services Conditions of Employment Act requires 
freeze regulations in the interests of the stability of 
the eccinomy." 57. 
The point that McMullin J is making is a good one. There is a 
clash between the wide ranging ambit of the Economic Stabilisation 
Act and the more limited operation of the State Services 
Conditions of Employment Act. In the area of wage fixing there 
is bound to be a clash between regulations imposing a wage freeze, 
pursuant to the purposes of the Economic Stabilisation Act, and 
other Acts which provide for normal procedures of wage fixing 
because those procedures will ha v e bec ome redundant a s no change 
in wages can be fixed. When measure s are introduced by 
regulation to freeze wages, which are just the sort of measures 
likely to be introduced under the 1948 Act, inevitably ' th~te will 
be interference with other wage negotiation statutes. 1t ·seems 
a little strange that interference should be alright in the 
context of the Industrial Relations Act 1973 but not in the 
context of the State Services Conditions of Employment AcL. It 
seems strange when the only real difference between them js the 
contrast between S.48 (1) c,f th e 1973 hct a n d S .6 ( 1 ) o f the 
197 7 Act. It is thi s d i ff e rence, howe ver, that ha s Jed 1.o the 
different decisions. Both Acts serve exactly the same type of 
function and were enacted to serve t he same sort s o f purpose 
one for the public sector, one for th e private sector. 
The different decisions must be attributed to the difference 
perceived by the Court in Parliamenta ry intention in the ~wo Ac ts. 
S.48(1) of the 1973 Act (or S.3E of t h e old 1954 Act) is worded 
in such a way that Parliament did no t intend that it be exclusive . 
S.6(1) on the other hand is strong evidence that Parliament 
intended the 1977 Act to be exclusive. 
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It is submitted that the more global v i ew of McMullin J would 
avoid the apparent inconsistency between the decisions in the 
Shop Employee~' case and the C.S.U. case . The specific Acts 
provide the ordinary procedure to be followed in normal wage 
negotiations. In times of economic instability when the 
Executive feel that far-reaching measu~es are needed they can 
invoke the Economic Stabilisation Act. The operation of the 
1948 Act is not intended to wreck or abolish the ordinary 
procedure, merely to suspend its operation for the period of 
the freeze. 
Richmond Jin Shop Employees said something similar to this: 
"I have reached the conclusion that it must have been the 
intention of the legislature, when it enacted the 
Economic Stabilisation Act, to authorise the making of 
regulations which would, to such extent as the Governor-
General in Council might consider necessary or expedient 
for the general purpose of the Act, derogate in some degree 
from the ordinary statutory procedures for fixing rates of 
wages in various sectors of the Community." 58. 
It is submitted t hat it is unn ecess ary, having dLtributed this 
clear intention to the legislature, to frustraLc it by reference 
to the provisions of the Act which is interfered with. The 
provision of S.6(1) of the State Services Conditions of 
Employment Act should not be interpreted as extending to cover 
the provisions of the Economic Stabilisation Act. As the 
Solicitor-General was reported to have said in the C.S.U. case 
it would be unlikely that the stabilisation regulations would 
not apply to 187,000 members of the work force . 59. Furthermore 
it cou ld n ot have bee n the i nt e nt ion of th e Jegj s Jature when they 
enacted the State Services Condit io ns of Employnicnt Act S.6(1) 
that it would operate to exclude the effects of the Economic 
Stabilisation Act. 
There was a further issue in the Drivers' case Lhat had to be 
dis c ussed once regulation SA had been held to satisfy the 
reasonably capable test. Th e ma j o rity posed il as: 
"Is the result altered by the traditional reluctance based on 
fundamental constitutional princples, to allow the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary Courts to be taken away? The reluctance 
27 
is especially strong when the interference is by regulation 
as distinct from an Act of Parliament; it may be called 
the rule in Chester v Bateson, fr o m th e Div is ional Court 
decision reported in (1920) 1 KB 829." 60. 
Chester v Bateson concerned regulations made pursuant to S.1(1) of 
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act 1914. That section 
provided that regulations may be made in general for securing the 
public safety and defence of the realm. Furthermore there was a 
power to authorise the trial and punishment of persons committing ·· 
offences against the regulations and in particular against 
regulations that were designed specifically in this case to 
prevent assistance being given to the enemy or the successful 
prosecution of the war being endangered. 
Regulation 2A(2) of the Defence of the Realm Regulations 1917 
provided that munitions workers who lived in 'special areas' 
may not have actions taken against them to obtain an order or 
decree for recovery of their houses or for the eviction of tenants 
from the houses they lived in. 
Darling J said of the regulation: 
"It is to be observed that this regulation not only deprives 
the subject of his ordinary right to seek justice in the 
Courts of Law, but provides that merely to r esort there 
without the permission of the Min i ste r o f Mu nitions first 
had and obtained shall of itself be a summary offence and 
so render the seeker after justice liable to imprisonment 
and fine." 61. 
The right to seek justice was held to be an elemental right that 
could n o t b e take n away ex cept by PaY:iarnent. '.l'he re g ula t:i on 
making power did not a uthori s e such~ step a s was tak e n in 
Regulation 2A(2). 
In the Drivers' case the maj o rity d r ew t he di stinction between 
industrial arbitration and the det e rmination of legal rights. 
Regulation SA only suspended the use of the Arbitration Court 
for disputes of interest which is a n a rb i trar y f unction of the 
Court, not one that involved the determination of legal rights. 
The rule in Chester v Bateson did not apply because Regulation SA 
did not prevent the Court from exe r cising its jurisdiction in 
solving issues of right. 
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What is interesting about the discussion in the majority judgment 
is this dictum: 
"At the beginning of our consideration of this question we 
wish to underline the importance of the rule in Chester v 
Bateson. Indeed we have reservations as to the extent to 
which in New Zealand even an Act of Parliament can take 
away the rights of citizens to resort to the ordinary 
Courts of Law for the determination of their rights." 62 -
It is clear that the majority consider that the rule enshrines 
a constitutional principle of some importance. What is more 
interesting is that the expression of doubt about the ability 
of Parliament itself to prevent access to the Courts for 
the determination of rights. 
Two points can be made about this. Firstly it is clear that 
they would require at the very least a provision expressing 
specifically that regulations made pursuant to the Act may 
deprive a person of his or her right to seek justice before 
the Courts of the land. Secondly it i s more probable that 
they consider that regulations can never do this. It appears 
that they consider it not an interpre tive presumption, rather 
an irrebuttable principle. 
Their doubt as to the ability of Parliament to take away the 
right is contrary to the decision in fhes ~er v Bateson itself. 
. 63. Darling J q~oted a passage with apparent approval from 
64. . Scrutton Jin In re Bealer. Scrutton J held that Parliament 
could deprive the subject of the right to have his or her rights 
determined by the Courts. 
While the opinion of the majority st e ms, no doubt, from a desire 
to uphold the Separation of Powers theory, it may just impinge 
upon the Sovereignty of Parliament. 
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PART IV 
CONCLUSIONS AND AFTERTHOUGHTS 
It might well be commented that the discussion in Part III of 
this note is of historical interest only when considered in the 
light of the Government's response to the decision in the C.S.U. 
case. 
When the decision was handed down the Government decided to validate 
the regulations and change the empowering Act r~ther than convert freeze 
the wage/price/into law by enacting it. In a flurry of 
parliamentary activity the Government - introduced and had passed 
the Economic Stabilisation Amendment Act 1982. Such was the 
speed with which it was rushed through the House that Geoffrey 
Palmer was prompted to say: 
"The proceedings of the Select. Committee were a study in the 
wondrous ways of making bad law. The Bill was introduced 
into the House yesterday. Yesterday we sat beyond 3 am. 
At 9 am the Select Co mmit tee began l istening to evidence. 
It sat until a quarter to two. At 5.30 pm wh en the House 
rose its members went back to deliberate. We finished at 
6.30 pm and we are now engaged in a proceeding to pass the 
Bill through all its stages." 
Mr Palmer was highlighting the time, or lack thereof, in which 
the Act was passed. In no uncertain terms he was arguing that 
there was insufficnt time for full consideration and debate on 
the Bill . 
The Commerce and Energy Committee , t o whom the BilJ was refe rred, 
recommended the insertion of a provision for d jsall o wan ce if 
within 28 days after having been tabled in Parliament a resolution 
is pas se d to disallow them. 
66. 
The Amendment Act overturned the effect of the decision in the 
C.S.U. case in 59(1). 
"The regulations spec ified in the Schedul e to this Act 
are hereby validated and conf irmed and are hereby declared 
to be, and to always have be e n, validly ma de under the 
principal Act." 
The effect of this provision is two fold. Firstly, the 
Regulations specified in the Schedule to the Act are validated, 
thus no question as to their validity can arise in the future 
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except insofar as S.9(3) provides that S.9(1) does not apply 
in cases of prosecutions for offences committed before the 
commencement of the Amendment Act. Secondly the regulations 
have been declared 'to be and to have always been, validly 
made under the principal Act.'. 
This is a rather curious provision. If only the first limb 
of the provision had been enacted Parliament would in effect 
be saying that they accept the decision of the Court of Appeal 
and that this is legislation to change the effect of their 
decision arid validate the regulations. The second limb 
goes further. In declaring the regulations to have always 
been validly made it appears to be saying that the reasoning 
in the decision is also overturned. 
It could be argued that they are saying one of two things in 
the second limbof S.9(1). First, it could mean that the 
Economic Stabilisation Act authorised such inconsistency with 
the State Services Conditions of Employment Act. Second it 
coul d mean, more general l y and mor e s ignificantl y , that 
regulations may override or interfere with statutes. Against 
the second possibility it is arguable that if thjs is what 
Parliament intended the section to mean, then the new S.llA 
enacted by the Amendment Act would be unnecessary and too narrow. 
The new S.llA provides that regulations made under the Act shall 
prevail over certain specified Acts listed in (2) insofar as 
they ielate to certain areas of the Acts to do with remuneration 
mentioned i n ( 1 } (a) , (b ) a nd (c). I t a J s o p r o v :i de s i n ( 3 ) 
that regulations shall pr eva i l over any Act thaL p r o vide s for 
the control adjustment or fixing of r e nts where there is conflict 
between them. (It is to be noted that the Industrial Relations 
Act 1973 and the State Service s Co n di t ions of Employment Act 1977 
both appear in S.11A(2) .) 
It is submitted that the new S.llA and S.9(1) of the 1982 
Amendment must h ave some meaning th er e fore the second po s sibility 
mentioned above cannot be what Par liame nt intend e d. S. 9 (1) 
must therefore be inperpre ted mo re restrictively. The s ection 
will be read as referring only to the regulations in the Schedule 
and to have no further effect. Its effect is to deem them to have 
always been valid. S.llA on the other hand is intended to 
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have future operation. There is now clear and unequivocal 
authority to make regulations which affect or conflict with the 
Acts mentioned in S.11A(2) . S.llA can be seen to be in fact 
enhancing the decision of the Court in the C.S.U. case. It 
illustrates that Parliament recognises the constitutional 
principle and the presumption and is er!suring that in future 
no question of lack of antecedent authority arises. 
It is also submitted that S.llA(2) is further evidence that, 
as was discussed before, the conflict was not so much between 
the stabil~sation regulations and other Acts rather the Economic 
Stabilisation Act itself and other Acts. Parliament has 
recognised that in the operation of the Economic Stabilisation 
Act there will be occasions on which regulations made pursuant to 
it are bound to conflict with the operation of other Acts. 
The discussion in Part III of this note is of more than historical 
interest only. The cases are mainly recent decisions of the 
Court of Appeal. The same reasoning and judicial te~hniques may 
well be applied to regulations made un de r the J 1onomic StabilisaLJon 
Act where what is at issue is considerations s uch as the 
presumption that regulations may not prevent access to the Courts 
for determination of rights. There are Acts not mentioned in 
S.11A(2) which may conceivably be interfered with. In the 
carless days and supply of petrol context, the Mo tor Spirits 
Distribution Act may be interfered with. Furthermore there may 
be similar empowering provisions in different Ac ts. 
The cases and the Amendment Act provide a backgr ound from which 
it is possible to make some comments of a more g eneral nature on 
the way the New Zealand Constitu tion is workin g . 
Deborah Shelton in her thesis concluded: 
"The needs of the modern state have requir ed the Executive 
to acquire and exercise powers, including l e gis lat ive powers, 
in and over the economy. If Constitutional Law is 
genuinely concerned with the control of th e function s of 
government, and if the Constitut i 0n is to re turn to a degre e 
of coherence, the existence and n atu re of the powers of the 
Executive must be in corporated in to tl1e Ne~ Ze aland 
Constitutional system, and, within the d emocratic pro cess 
ways of controlling them mu st be found.n 6 7. 
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It is submitted that since Ms Shelton concluded this, the controls 
on the Executive have certainly not been tightened and if anything 
have been relaxed even more. 
The 'reasonably capable' test which demands only a connection 
with the main purpose of the empowering Act that is more than 
'tenuous' or 'remote' will in fact mean that virtually all 
regulations made pursuant to an empowering provision similar 
to that of the Economic Stabilisation Act will be held to be 
valid. This is evidenced by the decision of the majority 
in the Drivers' case which held that regulation SA was valid. 
The presumption that Parliament would not abandon the entire 
field of the economy to the Executive is being gradually eroded 
by the increasing use of the powers of the 1948 Act. In times 
of world economic recession and hardship, when New Zealand's 
economy is forever threatened by inflation, large overseas debt 
and increasing balance of payment problems, most economic 
policies could be upheld in the name o f economic stability. 
When the most significant government action in dealing with the 
economy in the last ten years was taken by Order in Council, 
one begi~s to wonder about the validity of the presumption. 
Another area of worry was outlined by the S tatutes Revision 
Committee in their report on the Remuneration (New Zealand 
Forest Products) Regulations 1980. In a discussion of the 
significance of Section 4 of the Acts Interpretation Act the 
Committee, commenting on the fact that 'Act' includes 
regulations, means that in cases where the sLatutes allow things 
to b e done 'by any other Act' Parl.iament is in effect waiving 
its sovereignty. It stated: 
"The Committee is of the opinion that no amendment or 
alteration of an Act of Parliament should be effected by 
a simple act of the Executive unless Parliament has made a conscious decision that such a course is appropriate in 
all the circumstances." 68. 
It was this factor which lead to the decision in the Shop Employees' 
case and was of some influence in the ~ri vers' case. These 
decisions mean that the Arbitration Court's jurisdiction can be 
interfered with by regulation. Furthermore that regulations may 
interfere with the operation of the Industrial Relations Act. 
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The new S.llA of the Economic Stabilisation Act is in part also 
contrary to the spirit of the Comrnittee 1 s opinion. While 
P 1 . t h t d 1 t 1 t l 1.' :::: t 6 9 . f th A 
ar 1.amen as enac e an a mos comp e e ~ o e cts 
that may be interfered with, what it could not predict is the 
circumstances in which those Acts will be interfered with. 
By overturning the decision in the C.S.U. case the Amendment Act 
spurned a decision that high1ighted~ the traditional limits 
of executive power and at the same time slashed at the fetters 
which impose those limits. Its effect, as Geoffrey Palmer 
pointed out, is slightly ironic: 
"The Court of Appeal said that Parliament is supreme. The Government is saying that Parliament should surrender that supremacy. The Government's Bill clearly invites the House to make a conscious decision to transfer its powers to make law to the executive branch of the Government." 70. 
While the last sentence may reek of political exaggeration, there 
is no doubt that S.llA does give the Executive wide powers. It 
illustrates the fuzzy nature of the modern separation of powers. 
Firstly, not only does the Execut i ve have th e p ow er to make law 
which implements broad economic poli c y, but now the y can do it 
at the expense of Parliament. 
overrules statutes. 
The Executive can make law which 
Secondly the passing of such a piece o f legislation begins to 
undermine the relationship between the Courts and the Executive 
in the control of delegated legislation. The Amendment Act 
removed one aspect of judicial control over regulations made 
pursuant to the 1948 Act. While the Court might well have 
anticipated some parliamentary meas ures to va lJ da t e the 
regulations, the Amendment Act wen t f urther than than. 
Not all is bleak however. The wiJlin g n e ss of the Courts to uphol d 
the Chester v Bateson rule in appropri a te cases is encouraging, as 
was their willingness to uphold the p res umption against repugnancy. 
If all els e i s lost th e new S . 13A wi th it s provisi o n for di s alJowar c c 
of the regulations by resolutio n of Parl iamen t ma y b e indi c ative o f 
the move towards more parliamentary scrutiny and control of 
delegated legislation. - This may act a s a check on policy while 
the Courts will remain a check on legality. 
• 
(' 
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While on the fact of it the regulation - making power under the 
Economic Stabilisation Act 1948 may seem very wide, there are 
limitations to, and controls on it. Yet still there is a 
fear that the power, which many consider necessary in these 
troubled economic times, may be abused. 
p:rioblem forever. 
"O, it is excellent 
That has been a 
To have a giant's strength, but it is tyrannous 
To use it like a giant." 71. 
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